School District

Security and Safety Assessment

J&E Consulting Services

CSA Division

June 4, 2013

School District

Security and Safety Assessment

Conducted May 3rd and 5th



High School



Jr. High School



Intermediate School



5 Points Elementary



Dennis Elementary



Clearcreek Elementary

Report by

J&E Consulting Services

CSA Division

For




The School Safety Assessment

A school safety assessment is a strategic evaluation and facilities audit used to identify emerging and potential school safety problems. These activities identify the practices and places that may be over looked due a lack of understanding or an assumption that they are safe and trouble-free.

During an assessment, many key factors are examined to ascertain their direct impact on the student and staff safety, school climate, school attendance, and overall campus security. These factors may include:

- Existing school safety plans
- Crisis response and disaster mitigation plans
- Active Shooter/Anti-terrorist measures
- The condition and safety of the facilities
- The use of environmental design to prevent crime and disruption
- School safety policies, procedures and practices
- School discipline practices
- Employee supervision and training practices
- The presence of gangs, weapons, drug and alcohol abuse
- The prevalence of bullying, hazing, hate-motivated behaviors and other forms of harassment
- Social climate (staff, student and parents)
- School/law enforcement partnerships and other safety-promoting partnerships

School Safety Assessment Team



Walk Through

Tours and reviews were conducted at all current schools, the **sector** facility and the Board Offices on May 3rd and 5th. Full access to the facility was granted. Conversations were held with some management staff and office staff as well as a few of the teachers and maintenance staff. In general many provisions have been implemented for a safe school environment. During the evaluation some items came to light that although procedures and regulation are in place, do not seen to be fully implemented or possibly embraced. The general overview of the walk through is as follows:

General Issues

- Key control
 - Key Control is a problem. Keys are currently uncontrolled and many can be easily duplicated. There may be an unknown number of keys in un-authorized hands. This may be best solved by the implementation of a key card entry system.
- Phone System
 - Current phone system is computer controlled. Phone will not work if power is lost or phone computer is tampered with.
 - Hard phones lines, while in the facilities, are not marked or readily accessible. Staff does not know the location of hard lines.
 - Hard lines are readily accessible ant many of the schools. These lines can be quickly to deny phone hard line access.
- PA System
 - Currently the PA system can only be used from the main office. There is no backup system in place for emergency announcement if the front offices are not available.
- Dual Handles on external doors and internal doors
 - Existing handles permit doors to be chained in the closed position as in the Virginia Tech attacks. This denies exit or entry through these doors. Consideration should be given to have only a single handle on these doors.
- Unlocked electrical breaker boxes

- Multiple switch boxes were accessible in most schools and could be operated by unauthorized personnel.
- Some electrical boxes had broken key latch mechanisms and that prohibits the ability to secure the breaker switches.

• Entry Access

- In general front door attendants will buzz visitors directly into the facility unless something seems strange. In general it does not appear that training has been provided to determine what is considered suspicious and that is left to the attendant's consideration. Additionally, once a person has entered the main office area, access to all school areas is typically immediately available.
- Access door switches at Dennis and 5 points are not spring return switches. All doors are either locked or unlocked depending on the switch position for that door. Consideration should be given to using spring return switches on the main entrance doors so that they are unlocked only as long as the switches are held in the unlocked position.

• Door Identification

• Many external doors are not clearly marked with door numbers. It appears that the doors were not renumbered after additions to some of the facilities.

• Ability to Obscure View into Classrooms in Critical Situations

 Most of the class doors have windows in the doors for observation and many have windows beside the doors. In the case of an active shooter, denying the ability to see into a locked room typically had seen the shooter would move on to an easier target. Consideration should be given to placing blinds on any room where a lock down might occur.

• Securing Classroom Doors with Windows and Ventilation Panels

 All doors have the ability to be locked. Many of the schools have windows or ventilation panels that are positioned close to the door handles. Breaking the window provide easy means of unlocking the doors. Additionally most doors swing out and thus prohibit the use of barricades to prevent the door from opening. Consideration should be given to having a mechanical means of locking these doors where the mechanical lock cannot be reached through the broken door window.

• Classroom Doors Unlocked

- Most elementary and intermediate school classroom doors were unlocked. In the event
 of a crisis, the teachers will need to retrieve their keys and lock the doors to secure the
 classroom. Teachers have been notified that their doors should be locked but that
 practice is not being followed. In a critical situation, the ability to lock the doors might
 be inhibited.
- The JR. High school had about 30% of the classroom doors unlocked.
- The high School had less than 5% of the classroom doors unlocked.
- In general, as you move up in age, this recommendation is being more closely followed.
- Empty Classrooms Not Secured

- In elementary and intermediate schools, many classroom doors were left open and unlocked when unoccupied. This opens the room to theft or vandalism or unauthorized entrance.
- Computer and Phone Systems Not Secured
 - Access to computer networks, phone systems and alarms system was not restricted.
 Doors were either open or unlocked.
- Door Closing Mechanisms Need Adjusted and Maintained
 - Many of the door closure mechanisms on exterior doors need adjusted or replaced.
- Doors Blocked Open
 - Doors were found with carpet or other items wedged into the doors that prohibited the doors for being secured. This provides entry to any unauthorized person. It appears that the doors were left open for convenience.
- Many Posted Emergency Exits Obstructed by Improperly Storied Items
 - In the attached photos are many examples of emergency exits that have the hallway blocked. This creates a hazard for any emergency evacuation of the building.
- Main Power Feeds
 - The main Power in feed panels in the high school was fully accessible through unlocked doors.
- Roof Access
 - Access to the roof of the high school was accessible from an unlocked service area off of the stage control area. The rood assess cover was unlocked. See attached photo.
- Teachers Lounge
 - Teacher lounge areas were unlocked in all facilities. This provided the means to tamper with items or place devices in the teacher lounge areas. These areas should be secured.
- Panic Buttons
 - No panic buttons were available to front door receptionists. These should be used when a incident requiring a security response is needed at the from entry and office areas.
- Food Storage Areas
 - Food storage areas in many of the facilities were unsecured and access by un-authorized persons. This puts the food and beverage supplies at risk.
- Housekeeping
 - Housekeeping in typical outside and unseen interior areas needs to be improved. Trash and other items can conceal bombs or other distraction devices.
- Many Glass Windows are Obscured
 - Many windows in classrooms, storage areas and coaches offices had paper covering the windows. This prevents casual view of the interior of these areas and can conceal improper activity.
- Exterior Doors Unsecured After Hours
 - A door at **a second** and the JR High were unlocked after all sessions were closed. One door at the High School was propped open with the floor carpet runner.
- Sports Equipment Blocking Electrical Panels

- In the High School, electrical panels in the storage area were obstructed by storied sports equipment.
- Transformers were obstructed by storied sports equipment.

Steel Sign Post and Pipe Left Outside the Building

- These items may be used to break glass windows or be used to pry open doors.
- School Emergency Manuals
 - The current emergency manuals have a great deal of information.
 - The manuals should be updated for the latest contact information.
 - Information for some of the schools is incomplete.
 - Details n the ALICE Training should be added to the manual
 - Checklists for major critical incidents should be created and make available to all staff.
 - Procedures for receptionists should be created and the receptions training on procedures for critical incidents.


• Emergency Buttons/Pendants for all Receptionists.

- Currently the receptionists rely on the phone to call for any needed assistance.
- Considerations should be given to provide the means of signaling the alarm company,
 911 and senior school management that there is an issue at a school.
- In a Critical Situation the receptionist may not have time to make a phone call if they need to immediately leave the front desk due to a high level of threat.

School

Issues Observed during the walk through:

- **Reception Area**
 - Exterior doors are locked
 - was not gueried as to purpose of visit before 0 being permitted into the receptionist area has full access to the office and school areas once entry part the initial outside door was granted. After about 15 minutes in the from lobby area, was challenged later by a second staff member who called to confirm the appointment.





- Once access is gained to main office, an intruder has access to the complete school.
- Main entry door needs an intercom to query visitors before entry to the facility.
- Visitors were required to get a pass before entering the school.
- o Outer door control switches are A-B switches that are not spring return and will maintain either open or locked depending on the position they are left in.
- The receptionist did not seem to be fully trained and/or aware of emergency response for critical situations.
- CCTV Camera numbers do not match the actual door numbers. This can be confusing.
- CCTV does not cover the parking areas.
- Plans or checklist for emergencies did not seem readily accessible to the receptionist.
- Office Area
 - Door leading to main school hallway was unlocked and fully accessible.
 - Principle offices are fully accessible once a person is in the building.
 - o Clinic door do have observation windows and have blinds available when privacy is required.
 - The nurse stated that a RN is always available during normal school hours.
 - Medications were properly stored and locked in the clinic.
 - Staff has been trained in the use of EPI Pens. 0
- **Exterior Areas**
 - Dense foliage on the South side of the facility could easily hide aggressors.
 - Gate to HVAC equipment was unsecured.
 - Gas main is not fenced.

- General
 - Most classroom doors were found in an unlocked condition.
 - Empty classrooms were not secured.
 - Standard toggle light switches in all restrooms.
 - Class changes had excellent adult supervision and student movement seems well coordinated.
 - All coolers in the kitchen are unlocked during the day and evening. This was requested by the teachers who use the coolers for some events. Special needs classes stored items in the coolers.
 - Doors to the kitchens are not secured after hours. This could permit unauthorized access to drinks and foods resulting in theft or tampering.
 - Doors to the custodian areas off the kitchen were not secured. This permitted access to dangerous chemicals.
 - MSDS sheets were readily accessible.
 - Rear delivery door closer needs to be adjusted to fully close the door. The door does not always lock automatically. This door also needs a peep viewer to permit staff to determine who is at the door before opening the door.
 - Entry and exit double doors can be chained shut to prevent exit.
 - Boiler room is used as a storage area for large amount of tables and chairs.
 - Phone system is down during a power failure. The phone may not be on the backup generator.
 - \circ $\;$ Two way radios and Megaphones are located in each ELA.
 - Science supply cabinet was unlocked in an unsecure room. Access to dangerous chemicals was possible. See photos.

Issues observed during the walk through:

share the same physical layout so much of the items discussed in the review above applies to **a second seco**

- General
 - Swipe cards do not work at the facility
 - CCTV system has camera labeled with camera number and door number matching, this will help eliminate confusion during a critical situation..
 - Backup generator does not cover phone system at this facility. Plain Old telephone
 System (POTS) are available but not labeled or known by staff. This may also be true of

Main entrance to **prevent** No barrier to prevent the crashing of a car or truck through the front windows in currently in place..



Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras are readily viewed by the receptionist but the cameras are not numbered the same as the doors. Relabeling the cameras to correspond to the actual door number will make identification easier in a critical situation.



Once entry is gained to the receptionist, full access is granted to an aggressor to the principals offices and to the main school hallways.



View of office support area.



Workroom has no window covers to deny view to an aggressor if a lockdown is attempted.



Main entrance door to the school corridors is not secured. This provides access to any person who gets through the front doors.



Interior doors currently have dual handles. This permits them to be chained by an aggressor trapping any inside the area. Going to a single door handle would deny this to an aggressor.

Same issue with a different style door handle.





Unlocked electrical panels located in a main hallway area.

Supply cabinet located in a storage area with the door unlocked for the entrance to the area and the cabinet was also unlocked. Many dangerous chemicals were storied in the cabinet.





Access doors to the network server area in the library were not locked.

The building alarm system is in the same area and was also not secured.





Play areas do not have a well defined boundary the easily keep children away from vehicle access areas.

Foliage surrounding the school could easily hide an aggressor or an unauthorized person.





View of office support area.



Workroom has no window covers to deny view to an aggressor if a lockdown is attempted.



Main entrance door to the school corridors is not secured. This provides access to any person who gets through the front doors.



Intermediate School

Issues Observed during the walk through:

- Reception Area
 - Exterior doors are locked
 - Once access is gained to main office, an intruder has access to the complete school.
 - Visitors are required to sign in and get badge.



- General
 - External door have dual handles that can be chained or locked closed from the exterior to prohibit any emergency exit.
 - \circ $\;$ Kitchen doors unlocked and access to juices, water bottles and snacks was noticed.
 - Teacher lounge is unlocked and accessible.
 - Tall shrubbery obscures the view of the gas meters. Persons tampering with the meters and gas lines are hidden from view. IED or bombs can be concealed by the shrubbery.
 - All outside doors need the door closure mechanisms checks as many will not completely close and latch the doors.
 - Exit light at main entrance is not illuminated.
 - The computer room is unsecured, doors were open and full access is available to all computer systems.
 - Key box was unsecured and wide open.
 - Keys available to any who would remove them.
 - Some rooms had unsecured laptop computers accessible. Computers did not have cable locks to secure them to the docking stations.
 - Expanding barriers located in the hallways that are used to secure prohibited events had open padlocks. These barriers could be implemented and locked by non-authorized personnel.
 - Flammable cabinet was in a unsecured room and the cabinet was also unlocked. Access to flammable materials is readily available.
 - Dead tree has fallen on fence on the north side of the property.
 - Science chemicals were in unsecured rooms in unlocked cabinets.
 - Standard toggle light switches in all restrooms
 - Trash boxes were left on north side of the building. Items such as this can provide a place to hide an IED, fire or smoke bomb or other distraction device.
 - Electrical breaker boxes in hall were not locked. Switches were available to open and close at will.

Foliage obscures windows and provides hiding places for intruders or aggressors.

Foliage should be no higher the 3 foot or lower than 8 foot.





Dual door handles on external doors provide the opportunity for an assailant to chain the doors closed to prohibit exit of teachers and students or entry of first responders. Removal of one or both handles is recommended





Lap top computers were readily accessible and were not secured to the docking station . The docking was also not secured to any solid feature.



Multiple electrical boxes were accessible to students and most were unlocked.







Unlocked key storage and alarm systems in unlocked room. Access to server area was also unsecured.







Unlocked key storage and alarm systems in unlocked room. Access to server area was also unsecured.



Barriers used to secure areas of the schools during sporting events has open padlocks. This could be used to lock areas by an unauthorized person.



Cabinets for chemicals were found unlocked in unsecured rooms





Cabinets for flammable liquids were unlocked in unsecured rooms



Heavy foliage obscuring view of barrier fencing



Storage containers located around outside perimeter of the building. This can be used to plant IEDs, Bombs or distraction devices.



Issues Observed during the walk through:

- Reception Area
 - o Exterior doors are locked
 - Once access is gained to main office, an intruder has access to the complete school.
 - Magnetic lock is on one door exiting office to class
 hallway. However other doors provide free access to the main school hallway.



• General

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- Entry and exit double doors can be chained shut to prevent exit.
- Standard toggle light switches in all restrooms
- Some classroom doors were found in an unlocked condition. However this was less than 20% of the doors checked. This was during class session.
- The kitchen was unlocked and some coolers were locked. The staff did question the presence of strangers in the area. This had not initially seen Mr. Madden or Sergeant Wilson. This was very observant on their part.
- One of the doors to the main gym had a broken door mechanism and will not lock closed.
- Many classroom windows were covered and the internal activity could not be readily observed.
- Many expensive band instruments were left lying about in the hallways and were not secured. This could pose a theft problem for very expensive items.
- Unusual trash containers were outside doors, most likely used to prop open doors, and could be a hiding place for explosives.
- The computer labs were left unlocked after hours and full access was available at will.
- Brush and foliage outside the office obstructs the view and permits a place for a thief or aggressor to hide.

Dual door handles on external doors provide the opportunity for an assailant to chain the doors closed to prohibit exit of teachers and students or entry of first responders. Removal of one or both handles is recommended



Computer labs were unsecured.





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Computer labs were unsecured.





Entry door to the clinic was unlocked. Storage cabinets in the clinic for medical supplies and Over The Counter Drugs was unlocked.





Exterior electrical box is unsecured and left open.



Miscellaneous containers used for trash and as door stops to prop doors open. These may be used to conceal bombs and diversion devices.

Issues Observed during the walk through:

- Entry Area
 - Exterior doors are locked
 - Access to the reception area is locked but once inside the reception area access to the office from this area is permitted.
 - This area was visited after closing hours
 - o Procedures for visitors were posted
 - Visitor records drawer was unlocked
 - o Visitor badges were unlocked
- Office Area
 - Magnetic lock is on one door exiting office to class hallway.
 - Rollup door from office to hallway was unlocked
- General
 - Some classroom doors were found in an unlocked condition. However this was less than
 5% of the doors checked. This was after class session.
 - Standard toggle light switches in all restrooms
 - Entry and exit double doors and some internal doors can be chained shut to prevent exit.
 - Some PE Office has paper obscuring the view into the offices. G115 and G111 were noted.
 - Wrestling/tumbling mats are storied in emergency exit hallways
 - Wrestling coach's rooms were unlocked. Chemicals were stored in this area.
 - Emergency exit completely block in wrestling area. See photo.
 - F123 Scene Shop had fire door blocked. Note that this door was marked by the fire department as required to be kept clear.
 - The band room were secured and properly locked. Instruments were secured.
 - The CCTV camera junction port in the band office is unsecured and in plain sight for possible tampering.
 - The lock on door E102 seems to be broken and was unsecured. This permits access to the control room for the auditorium and main building electrical cabinets.
 - Roof access door was unlocked and any student in the area could access the roof.
 - Access to main electrical enclosures this the area was wide open
 - High voltage electrical cabinets were not locked.



- Fuse boxes in Hallway B were unsecured, close to room B204 Door has broken lock.
- One of the fire extinguishers in the cafeteria could not be opened until pried open with a screwdriver. Opening this door by hands alone would not have been possible. See photo.
- CCTV system has no coverage of the parking lots.

Foliage obscures windows and provides hiding places for intruders. Foliage should be no higher the 3 foot or lower than 8 foot.







Notices to visitor is well displayed

No magnetic lock on second entrance door for additional layer of containment.

Magnetic lock is on entrance to main school hall.





Mag lock is on additional door to school main hallway.



Steel posts left outside the building. These posts can be used as weapons or to break windows for entry to the school.



Wrestling mats are storied in main hallway blocking the emergency exit route.



Sports equipment is piled on electrical transformer. Sports equipment is blocking access to electrical panels.



Sports equipment is in front of the emergency exit from the wrestling area.



Exterior door is blocked open with floor carpet runner. Open access if permitted.

Emergency exit path is blocked with storage materials in art and prop area,

Emergency exit path is blocked with storage materials







Door posted by Fire Department as required to be kept clear are heavily obstructed.





Camera network terminal in band office not secured and available for tampering.




Access door to stage control booth has broken lock and can not be secured. Storage area off of control room is not locked. This provides access to electrical control panels and roof access.

Roof access door is not locked. Free path to the roof is available to students and others.



Area at base of service ladder is very cluttered. Large amounts of objects were placed in this area. Door to service ladder is unlocked





Springboro High School

Electrical panels in the service area are not locked. This includes the electrical switch gear units and lighting unit.







Damage thermostat in control room storage area.

Non functioning door latches in cafeteria.





Cafeteria fire extinguisher storage cabinet is damages. It had to be pried with a screwdriver to open the door to gain access to the extinguisher. In an emergency, this unit may not have been available.



Several windows in offices and work areas are obscured. This prevents observation of prohibited activities.





Issues Observed during the walk through:

- Entry Area is wide open
 - No restrictions to any office or area are in place.
- Full glass panel door provide minimal protection against breaking and vandalism.

Board Offices

Foliage obscures windows and provides hiding places for intruders or aggressors.

Foliage should be no higher the 3 foot or lower than 8 foot.





Board Offices

Foliage obscures windows and provides hiding places for intruders. Foliage should be no higher the 3 foot or lower than 8 foot.



Exterior access door at each end of the facility has tall windows. Not providing has been made to reduce view from outside if needed. Glass is also very easy to break to gain entry into the facility.

